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Abstract
Argentine economic development from 1864 to 1983 can be
roughly devided into a period of economic progress (1864 -
1930) and into one of economic decline (1930 - 1983). Of the
many issues that could potentially explain such an unprece-
dented development of a basically resource-rich country, this
paper deals with distributional conflicts, inflation, exoge-
nous shocks and political instability. The analysis shows
that redistributive incomes policies in favour of labour and
government accomodated by a very loose monetary policy seem
to lie at the heart of an institutionalised distributional
conflict over a stagnant national income. To the extent that
political instability can be associated with the underlying
distributional conflict the political cycle hypothesis adds
some explanatory power to the above. With the only exception
of World War I, which seems to have triggered inward-oriented
industrialisation policies, exogenous shocks do not seem to
have been of major importance for Argentine economic ..- per-
formance; at best such shocks should have reinforced the
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I. The Big Picture
1. Argentina's historical pattern of economic development
differs in more than one way from that experienced by compar-
able countries, and particularly so in her poor growth per-
formance during the last 50 years. In this respect Argentina
is an outstanding example of a country economically declining
both relative to other countries as well as to its own past
record [Diaz-Alejandro 1981]. Yet Argentina's slow growth can
hardly be explained by low or inadequate resource availabili-
ty, for she is relatively richly endowed with human and natu-
ral resources; in fact Argentina seems to match quite well
the paradox of a resource-rich but poor country.
2. Analyses of growth cycles in less developed countries
are rare . This is surprising because slow economic growth is
Simon Kuznets [1973] and W. Arthur Lewis [1978] are among
the few that worked in this field.- 2 -
generally acknowledged to be the main problem of these coun-
tries. The reason for this deficiency may be that, rather
than growth itself, underemployment of factors of production,
a lack of complementary factors like physical and human capi-
tal and/or basically non-economic aspects (illiteracy, health
standards and food shortages) have been held to be the impor-
tant issues [Lewis 1984, Papanek 1983]. Also, a lack of a
sufficiently reliable data basis is probably more common a
hindrance for empirical studies regarding less developed than
developed countries [Randall 1976],
3. Graph 1 gives an overview of Argentine economic perform-
ance since 1864. The curves represent investment shares, and
3 and 9 year moving averages of the deviations of real gross
domestic product and investment from their exponential
trends. At first glance the pattern of Argentina's develop-
ment does not reflect evidence on long-wave behaviour of in-
i
dustrial countries' aggregate production, which suggests that
the current economic downswing, as measured by social pro-
ducts, investment and employment, began in the early (West
Germany) or late (France) sixties [van Duijn 1983, Freeman
1983], Several very particular features deserve to be men-
tioned:
- the regular pattern of economic upswings and downswings,
resembling a sinusoidal curve of the Kuznets type rather
than of the Kondratieff type. Measured peak to peak each
cycle has a length of about 17 years;
- amplitudes seem to have been declining continuously, in- 3 -
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fact they virtually disappeared in recent years;
- since the late thirties economic development has been per-
sistently below its long-run average.
4. Looking at the peaks and troughs reveals that there have
been at least three full cycles since 1870. The first had its
trough about 1880 and its peak in 1893. The second "began" in
1900 and reached its zenith in 1909. Finally, the third
trough can be located around 1918 with the upswing ending in
1926. From then on one may speak of a continuous trough in
development, with some small indication of recovery starting
around the early 1960s.
5. The purpose of this paper is to present and to discuss
some hypotheses explaining Argentine development. Specifical-
ly, it will focus on
- the distributional conflicts hypothesis,
- the inflation hypothesis,
- the world market hypothesis and
- the political cycle hypothesis.
Not mentioned here is the Schumpeterian innovation hypothe-
sis, because it does not seem to be relevant to developing
countries.- 5 -
II. Explanation of Argentine Long Waves
1. The Distributional Conflicts Hypothesis
6. Hypotheses concerning distributional conflicts have been
advanced in the 1970s [Glismann et al. 1978] as the main
cause of long-run cycles in economic development. Such hypo-
theses had already been put forward by Karl Marx and his fol-
lowers, today particularly by Ernest Mandel [1980], and also
by Mancur Olson [1982]. Whilst Marxists place special empha-
sis on the exploitation of the "working class" by "capital-
ists", non-Marxist authors study distributional conflicts
among organised interest groups, i. e. between trade unions
and employers' organisations, among entrepreneurs, between
consumers and producers, between organised and non-organised
labour and, also, between government bureaucracy and private
productive factors.
7. In the case of Argentina, two kinds of distributional
conflicts can be identified. First, the one between organised
labour and entrepreneurs. This hypothesis states that any
change in the relative position of one party adversely af-
fects the other party in a zero sum fashion. In case labour
/demands and receives wage increases in excess of productivity
growth, profitability of capital investment is reduced. In
circumstances where the marginal product of labour is equal
to or even below real wages, such wage increases also lead to
unemployment. In the wake of falling profit rates investment- 6 -
in domestic physical capital declines, and thus ultimately
social product decreases.
The second distributional conflict pertains to the bureaucra-
cy exploiting the productive sector. The model assumes that
there is such a thing as a growth-optimal degree of public
goods production by the government. Taking internal security
as an example, a too low supply of law enforcement would pre-
vent economic growth to reach its maximum, whereas on the
other hand too much law enforcement would obstaculise econom-
ic development. This implies that government can be very ef-
fective in constraining economic activity by engaging in pub-
lic goods production. Bureaucratic exploitation also takes
place when government supplies protection of any kind, i. e.
does not guarantee the openness of markets. The ensueing es-
tablishment of a market for protection takes resources away
from productive use (in a macroeconomic sense) and allocates
them toward unproductive activities. Artificial bureaucrati-
sation of the private sector should be closely related to the
size of the official bureaucracy.
8. Trade unions exist in Argentina since the second half of
the 19th century and can be closely associated with immigra-
tion flows because European immigrants brought with them the
idea as well as the know how of labour organisation. The im-
portance of trade unions grew with industrialisation, that is
particularly since 1930, when import substitution policies
began to be implemented. Concentration of workers in urban— 7 —
areas helped create favourable conditions for labour organi-
sation. Since the mid-1940s trade unions became a central
element in social life, and under Peron (1943 - 1955) a cen-
tralised union empowered to raise and allocate membership
fees which, due to the quasi-closed-shop system in the manu-
facturing sector, virtually made trade unions a part of pub-
lic administration.
As regards distributional conflicts arising from government
intervention, two issues in Argentine economic history seem
worth mentioning: the nationalisation of manufacturing and
services companies, particularly of foreign, companies, and
bureaucratic redistribution. Foreigners had been the main
source of entrepreneurial impulses since the country's inde-
pendence in 1810. Especially since the 1940s, nationalisation
of "key industries" - directed first against British "imperi-
alism" and later against U.S. domination- brought with it the
emergence of a large number of state-owned companies. In the
banking sector, in public utilities as well as in industry,
government became more and more the dominating entity [Ran-
dall 1978].
Also beginning in the 1940s was a policy aiming at distribu-
tional justice rather than at economic efficiency. Per&n be-
lieved that social justice would ultimately lead to economic
progress ; as it turned out this was an invitation to a per-
Incidentally, Peron's party called itself "Partido Justi-
cialista", which means "social justice party".- 8 -
manent struggle for higher shares in national income. Produc-
tivity as a criterion for distribution has virtually not mat-
tered since. In Argentina the bulk of transfer payments con-
sisted of direct firm or sectoral subsidies; interpersonal
transfers, very common in more developed countries, have ra-
ther been of marginal importance.
9. Graph 1 highlights the relationship between the long-run
cycles of gross domestic product and investment activity;
Graph 2 shows the relationship between gross domestic activi-
ty and indicators of income distribution. As regards gross
domestic product and gross investment, their respective cyc-
lical patterns match quite well. The first impression is that
the peak years of 1909 and 1926 are identical for both indi-
cators and that the same holds true for the trough of invest-
ment development at the end of the First World War (1918) as
well as for the one in the Second World War (1941). From 1941
onwards mainly shorter cycles of the Juglar-type seem to have
dominated. It is noteworthy that the ratio of investment to
gross national product also reveals a long-run decline since
1907/1910 up to the present. Investment activity helps to ex-
plain the weak performance of the Argentine economy after the
peak of 1926: this ratio never again came near to that of the
years 1904 to 1914 and 1923 to 1929. In other words, since
1929 consumption seems to have been much more rewarding than
savings and domestic investment.- 9 -
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10. Such developments can basically have two explanations.
One would be that income has been redistributed from the rich
to the poor; this would result in higher consumption. The
other one would be that investment profitability declined and
thus either consumption or capital exports increased. In
Graph 2 the wage/productivity ratio has been taken as an in-
dicator of both redistributional incomes policies and of la-
bour costs. One can observe that from 1919 until 1947 real
wages increased faster than productivity. After 1947 the
"gap" between real wage growth and productivity declined
again, though very slowly at first. In fact, the time span
between 1946 and 1956 resembles a high-wage plateau.
Since 1956 the ratio of wages to productivity has been fall-
ing; indeed, after 1974 this decline is extraordinary, due to
the tremendous fall in real wages (Paldam 1985). The dramatic
dip in real wages of about 70 per cent between 1974 and 1978
has no precedent in recorded economic history; one of the
factors "explaining" it is the freezing of nominal wages by a
new administration in 1976 while inflation continued. The
question to be answered is why overall economic activity did
not respond to this decline in labour costs: Possibly, the
distributional conflicts hypothesis - at least as far as the
conflict between labour and entrepreneurs is concerned - may
not be symmetrical, i. e. high wages and low profit rates al-
ways dampen investment activity whereas the converse - low or
declining real wages - does not necessarily encourage invest-
ment; other conditions may be important, too. Second, expec-- 11 -
tations matter. In case entrepreneurs do not believe the wage
decline to be lasting they tend to wait rather than to pre-
cipitate investment; investment data (graph 1) support this
notion. Severe and sudden changes of economic variables, in
whatever direction, inhibit investors who prefer graduality
to shocks.
The mirror image of the labour income/labour costs pattern is
given by the development of the residual incomes share in
gross domestic product. Again, there is striking evidence for
a low residual incomes share between the mid 40s and the late
50s. This alone may account for the persistently low level of
investment activity in this period. Since unions in Argentina
had the power to strongly influence the wage level most of
the time, the share of wages in total national income can be
supposed to have risen above the share which would have been
determined by labour productivity alone. Thus, industrialisa-
tion appears to have been obstructed by the distributional
effects of unionisation. Unionisation may therefore have neu-
tralised any incentives for investment created by import sub-
stitution policies.
11. Government's influence as measured by total government
expenditure (Graph 2) increased drastically in 1937; however,
this may well have been a singular event when compared to the
expenditure levels achieved in adjacent years. In 1944,
though, government activity expanded again and remained at- 12 -
high levels until 1958. This does not mean, of course, that
government refrained from crowding out productive factors af-
ter 1958: today's severe debt problems of the Argentine eco-
nomy seem to be related to the deficit spending policies im-
plemented since the late 1950s.
12. All in all, empirical evidence suggests that the econom-
ic problems of Argentina did not only start in the 1930s and
1940s as is commonly believed. Rather, incomes and investment
indicators exhibit much earlier distortions.
2. The Inflation Hypothesis
13. Inflation generally makes economic efficiency decline
for two reasons. One is concerned with the rate of inflation,
the other with the variability of the rate of inflation. The
first argument says that inflation per se alters resource al-
location and produces losers and winners. Losers are those
with fixed or lagging incomes; among them are savers and as-
set holders, employees and pension holders. Winners are those
whose incomes pveradjust to inflation; usually these are real
estate holders, speculators and other "shrewd" people. This
reduces allocational efficiency by reducing overall savings
in favour of unproductive speculative investment. In addi-
tion, inflationary monetary policy does not leave relative
prices unchanged because newly created money is injected into
certain sectors of the economy and spent only on certain
kinds of goods and services, the prices of which rise before- 13 -
other prices feel the pull [Hayek, 1966]. In this way rela-
tive prices are constantly moving, not according to real
scarcities but to monetary phenomena; in fact the link be-
tween real scarcities and prices becomes very weak under hy-
perinflationary conditions.
The second argument says that predictability of inflation
rates matters, too. Whilst in the case of comparatively stea-
dy inflation rates entrepreneurs and consumers already have
difficulties to extract information on relative prices from
the markets, this information becomes totally blurred in
cases of volatile rates of inflation: "the broadcast about
relative prices is as if it were being jammed by the noise
coming from the inflation broadcast" [Friedman 1977, p. 27].
Overall allocational efficiency consequently further declines
with increasing unexpected variation in inflation rates.
14. Argentine monetary history can be divided into three im-
portant periods on the basis of the standard by which the pe-
so was defined. The gold exchange standard prevailed until
the late thirties; following textbook wisdom, money creation
was strictly limited to gold supply during this period . Ac-
cording to Mises such a standard is the best insurance
against spendthrift governments [Mises 1953]. After a tran-
sitional period based on a Sterling standard, the U.S. dollar
It should be noted that there has been one exception to
this rule, namely the Baring crisis of 1890/91, when in-
flationary paper money creation to cope with public de-
ficits disrupted the Argentine financial sector following
the suspension of gold convertibility in 1885.- 14 -
became the new currency standard after World War II. Thus,
Argentina became free to pursue monetary policies which were
not subject to the automatic discipline of the gold standard.
One of the causes of inflationary growth of money was the na-
tionalisation of bank deposits between 1946 and 1957, and la-
ter again between 1973 and 1976. Only up to 1949 did credit
expansion of the central bank have an upper limit (credits
could be extended up to 25 % of existing gold and foreign
currency reserves). In 1949 this limit was dropped, and cre-
dit creation has been virtually uncontrollable since. Only in
1957 a fractional reserve system was introduced. However, the
legal opportunity to control inflation was not used. The cen-
tral bank, still in the hands of the government, continued to
pursue expansionary monetary policies. The reason may have
been the political weakness of governments vis-a"-vis unions
and other organised interests [Del Canto 1982]. The same ap-
plies to the period after 1976.
15. Graph 3 presents the highlights of Argentine monetary
history. Money supply and inflation, the latter measured by
the consumer price index, turn out to be highly correlated
during the period studied. It becomes quite clear that
- inflation posed no great problem before 1944. After that
money supply virtually exploded, leading to an average lev-
el of inflation of roughly 20 per cent per annum between
1940 and the late fifties. After that, rates of inflation- 15 -
even increased and were followed by hyperinflation from
1970 on;
- with a grain of salt, trend deviations of money supply - as
measured by M? (i. e. cash plus demand deposits plus time
deposits) - support the hypothesis that monetary discipline
loosened significantly in the late thirties and early four-
ties and again during the 1960s and 1970s.
These observations fit extremely well into the history of Ar-
gentine monetary institutions. What is more, trend deviations
exhibit that monetary policy of the 1960s and 1970s was by no
means something unprecedented. The "monetary revolution" took
place in the 1940s; today's inflationary money supply rather
seems to be a follow up.
16. Liquidity coefficients of the Argentine economy - as
measured by the ratios of M- (cash plus demand deposits) and
M9 to GDP - show the effects of inflation on money holdings
(Bernholz 1985) . The gap between the M- and the M? coeffi-
cients partly reflects the effects of inflation on savings.
This gap has been decreasing since 1940, with a small and re-
latively stable gap between, say, 1959 and 1975. The relative
level of savings, however, also decreased in the "stable"
phase. After 1975, the gap increased again, possibly due to
positive real interest rates since 1976.
17. All in all, the pattern of inflation does not contradict
the long-run development of gross domestic product. Indeed,- 16 -
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in view of the regularity of the long wave of GDP before the
1930s one could have expected a new upswing starting in the
mid-thirties. But this did not happen; in fact under infla-
tionary conditions GDP never recovered again.
3. Two Other Hypotheses
18. The explanatory power of the distributional conflicts
hypothesis and of the inflation hypothesis does seem to be
quite strong. Nonetheless, other hypotheses may also be im-
portant, given that our analysis covers a fairly long period
of Argentine history, involving substantial institutional and
policy changes. Of the many other approaches that would seem
to also fit the Argentine case the following two seem to be
most promising:
- changes in world market conditions had an impact on domes-
tic economic activity;
- uncertainties introduced into the Argentine economy through
frequent changes in political power obstaculised investment
and production.
19. Argentina's international economic relations, both with
respect to trade and capital flows has been characterised by
concentration [Kawata 1972]. Export trade was not only highly
concentrated regarding commodity composition but also regard-
ing regional distribution. The main customer for Argentine
agricultural goods was the United Kingdom, from independence
until, say, the end of World War II. Since World War I also- 18 -
the United States gained importance as a market for Argentine
products. In the last 40 years the US gradually became the
dominant trade partner, followed (until 1973, when trade re-
lations with EC countries were brusquely reduced due to the
EC's agricultural protection) by Western European countries,
notably by Italy. Commodity imports followed similar regional
(though not product-specific) patterns, with the United
States being the most important source of Argentine imports.
Capital inflows into Argentina as well as its capital out-
flows exhibit a similar geographical distribution.
20. Thus, it can be hypothesised that major changes in the
world markets are very likely to have had severe income ef-
fects. Examples of such exogenous events can be seen in the
two world wars and in the Great Depression. Also, ad hoc dis-
crimination of Argentine exports on political grounds falls
under this heading, as the EC's boycott in the wake of the
Falkland/Malvinas conflict in 1982, or as the one imposed on
Argentina in the years of World War II. Non-tariff barriers
to imports from Argentina, particularly beef imports, have
been applied by the United States (since the 1950s; the offi-
cial reason given was the danger of transmitting hoof-and-
mouth disease) as well as by the European Community (since
1973 within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy).
The hypothesis following from these experiences would be that
the Argentine economy had strong incentives to insure against
such export risks - either by diversifying exports, or
through a reduction of imports and consequently through im-
port substitution. Indeed, import substitution has been the- 19 -
"Leitmotiv" of Argentine economic policies since the 1930s
[Foders 1983].
21. As regards the political cycle hypothesis it rests on
the observation that investment as well as capital imports
react sensibly to political risk. Such risk can be seen in
unexpected and frequent changes in government, particularly
if this is associated with fundamental changes in policy.
22. Graph 4 shows the long-run development of the index of
international integration of the Argentine economy, measured
as the share of exports plus imports in GDP and as the devia-
tion of this indicator from its long-run trend. The degree of
international integration of Argentina has been constantly
declining over the whole period between 1865 and 1980; since
1950, the average share of foreign trade in GDP was about 20
percent. One may distinguish three phases of international
integration: the first and highest lasted until the turn of
the century; the second, on a considerably lower level, can
be observed between 1900 and 1920; then came a strong decline
over 25 years until, in 1950, the current and relatively low
level was reached.
The deviations from the long-run trend are further evidence
for the importance of these three phases. It turns out, that
the largest and longest deviation from the trend of integra-
tion lies between the mid-twenties and the 1960s. According
to the world market developments discussed above this may be
labelled the "import substitution belly". Thus, neither World- 20 -
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War I, nor the Great Depression nor World War II have been
the origin of the stepwise decline - unless, of course, there
are hidden time lags.
23. Export performance can contribute to explain the pattern
of international integration. One can interprete the data as
follows: exports have been relatively increasing from 1860
until 1917. From then on came a steady decline until the ear-
ly fifties; exports did not recover fully in the sense of ex-
ceeding the long-run trend. These developments can serve to
reconsider the above refutation of the hypothesis concerning
the impact of world wars. It seems that at first World War I
contributed to the expansion of Argentine exports, but that
in the longer run Argentine exports have been severly hamper-
ed - either by a misguided domestic economic policy (import
substitution), or by some sort of discrimination by its main
trading partners. It should be noted that at this time (in
the 1930s) the British Commonwealth was consolidated. Since
Argentina was not invited to participate in spite of the fact
that the British were the main customers for Argentine goods
at that time, this meant an important loss of foreign markets
to Argentina . Neither the Great Depression nor World War II
had any direct or discernible effect on exports or on the in-
tegration of the Argentine economy into the international di-
vision of labour.
24. The political development of Argentina can be divided
into four periods. First, a long and stable period prevailed
Argentina tried to overcome this discrimination by signing
a treaty with Great Britain, known as the Roca-Runciman
treaty. But this did not improve the situation much.- 22 -
until 1930 (still Graph 4) . In the "transition period" from
1930 to 1943 governmental instability increased for the first
time in this century. After 1943 again a stable period began
which came to an end in 1955. Since then a fairly long period
of high instability has prevailed. This pattern by and large
fits into the picture of economic development - with the ap-
parent exception of the years between 1943 and 1955. The lat-
ter was the period of income redistribution, government ex-
pansion and high rates of inflation.
III. Summary and Conclusions
25. Argentine economic development from 1864 to 1983 can be
roughly divided into a period of economic progress featuring
significant waves of the Kuznets type (1864-1934), and into a
period of economic decline with virtually no long-run fluc-
tuations of gross domestic product (1934-1983). Of the many
issues that could potentially explain such an unprecedented
development of a basically resource-rich country, this paper
has dealt with distributional conflicts, inflation, exogenous
shocks and political instability. The analysis shows that re-
distributive incomes policies in favour of labour and govern-
ment accomodated by a very loose monetary policy seem to lie
at the heart of an institutionalised distributional conflict
over a stagnant national income.
26. The explanatory power of each of these hypotheses, how-
ever, has varied over time. Argentine economic history may be- 23 -
described like this: The first incisive event in Argentine
economic development in the period under observation was
World War I. This was an exogenous shock for a country heavi-
ly depending on foreign trade. In the years thereafter the
degree of integration of Argentina into the world economy has
been decreasing, and consequently gross domestic product ex-
pansion slowed down. Starting in the 1930s, this trend trig-
gered inappropriate domestic policies aiming at income dis-
tribution rather than at economic growth. The rise of trade
unions, of populism (Peronism), and the implementation of im-
port substitution policies characterised the years since.
Government gradually became the main actor, besides trade
unions and entrepreneurs, also in economic matters. In order
to try to satisfy the demands of the conflicting interest
groups the government resorted to an easy monetary policy.
The consequence was that in periods when one would have ex-
pected economic recovery in the wake of improved profits,
high rates of inflation and political instability obstacu-
lised economic activity.
Exogenous shocks on world markets that occured after World
War I do not seem to have been of major importance for Argen-
tine economic decline. Nevertheless, such shocks - like the
Great Depression, World War II, the embargoes on Argentine
exports by the United States and the United Kingdom, and
factually also due to the EC's agricultural policies - have
presumably reinforced the negative effects of incomes and
monetary policies.- 24 -
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